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Abstract
Hyperproperties, as introduced by Clarkson and Schneider, characterize the correctness of a
computer program as a condition on its set of computation paths. Standard temporal logics
can only refer to a single path at a time, and therefore cannot express many hyperproperties of
interest, including noninterference and other important properties in security and coding theory.
In this paper, we investigate an extension of temporal logic with explicit path variables. We show
that the quantification over paths naturally subsumes other extensions of temporal logic with
operators for information flow and knowledge. The model checking problem for temporal logic
with path quantification is decidable. For alternation depth 1, the complexity is PSPACE in the
length of the formula and NLOGSPACE in the size of the system, as for linear-time temporal logic.
Submitted to CSL’13 on April 15, 2013
1 Introduction
The automatic verification of computer systems against specifications in temporal logic is one
of the great success stories of logic in computer science. A controversial question of this area,
with a continuous discussion in the literature since the early 1980s, is which temporal logic
is most suitable to describe and verify the relevant properties of interest. Traditionally, this
discussion has been framed as a choice between linear and branching time [36]. The linear
time paradigm of logics like linear-time temporal logic (LTL) describes the correct behavior
as a set of sequences [27]. This view allows us to express important temporal properties, like
invariants and eventualities, but ignores possible dependencies between different executions
of the system. The branching time paradigm of logics like computation tree logic (CTL)
describes the correct behavior in terms of multiple possible futures and therefore allows
to express of the existence of certain computations [10]. Emerson and Halpern’s CTL*
logic [13] unifies the linear and branching time view by combining path formulas with the
path quantifiers E and A, which allows to continue on an existentially or universally chosen
path.
An important limitation, common to all these temporal logics, is that they only refer to a
single path at a time and therefore cannot express requirements that relatemultiple paths. In
particular, this limitation excludes information flow properties as they are studied in security
and in coding theory. For example, noninterference [16], the property that certain secrets
remain hidden from an observer, relates all paths that have (possibly) different secrets but
otherwise identical input. Noninterference requires that all such paths are observationally
equivalent to each other. In coding theory, a typical requirement is that the encoder of a
communication protocol preserves the entropy of the input, which means that there does
not exist a pair of paths with different input but identical encoding. Clarkson and Schneider
coined the term hyperproperties [11], defined as sets of legal sets of behaviors, for this more
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2 A Temporal Logic for Hyperproperties
general class of properties. That is, a correct system must produce exactly one of the legal
combinations of behaviors described by the property.
In this paper we study how to extend temporal logics to hyperproperties. We generalize
the path quantifiers E and A to ∃pi and ∀pi, respectively, where pi is a path variable that may
be referred to in the subsequent path formula. As a result, we obtain a generalization of
CTL*, which we call HyperCTL. HyperCTL provides a uniform logical framework for linear-
time and branching-time hyperproperties. In this paper, we show that the quantification
over paths naturally subsumes related extensions of temporal logic that have previously
been studied in the literature, such as the hide operator of SecLTL [12], and the knowledge
operator of temporal epistemic logic [14, 34]. Additionally, HyperCTL can express a rich
set of properties that have previously been studied intensively, particularly in the security
community, but as isolated properties. HyperCTL provides a common logical framework
that allows to customize and compose these properties.
The paper is structured as follows. We introduce HyperCTL in Section 2. In Section 3,
we relate HyperCTL to other logics and show that the quantification over paths subsumes op-
erators for information flow and knowledge. The model checking and satisfiability problems
of HyperCTL are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we show applications of HyperCTL in
security, including noninterference, declassification, and quantitative information flow. We
conclude with a discussion of open problems in Section 6.
2 HyperCTL
In this section, we introduce HyperCTL, our extension of the temporal logic CTL* for
hyperproperties. We begin with a quick review of standard notation for Kripke structures.
2.1 Preliminaries: Kripke structures
A Kripke structure K = (S, s0, δ,AP, L) consists of a set of states S, an initial state s0 ∈ S,
a transition function δ : S → 2S , a set of atomic propositions AP, and a labeling function
L : S → 2AP. We require that all states s ∈ S have at least one successor, δ(s) 6= ∅.
The cardinality or size of a Kripke structure is defined as the cardinality of its states and
transitions |K| = |S| · |AP| + |δ|, where δ is interpreted as a set of tuples. A path pi ∈
(S × 2AP)ω is an infinite sequence of labeled states (i.e., states equipped with a set of
atomic propositions). For a path pi and i ∈ N, pi(i) is the i-th state of the sequence and
pi[i] is the i-th set of atomic propositions. Furthermore, we use pi[0, i] to denote the prefix
of pi up to (including) position i, and pi[i,∞] to denote the suffix starting at position i.
We lift these notions to tuples of paths by applying the operations for each position: e.g.
〈pi1, . . . , pin〉[i,∞] = 〈pi1[i,∞], . . . , pin[i,∞]〉. Every Kripke structure K gives rise to a set
of paths from any state s ∈ S, denoted by PathsK,s. To allow the case of a specification
referring to atomic propositions that are not contained in the atomic propositions AP of the
Kripke structure, we assume that these atomic propositions are not restricted. Therefore, we
define PathsAP
′
K,s =
{
(s1, P1∪P ′1).(s2, P2∪P ′2). . . . | (s1, P1).(s2, P2). · · · ∈ PathsK,s, ∀i. P ′i ⊆
AP′ \ AP}.
2.2 Syntax
We extend the syntax of CTL* with path variables. Path variables are introduced by path
quantifiers. Since formulas may refer to multiple paths at the same time, atomic propositions
are indexed with the path variable they refer to. The formulas of HyperCTL are defined by
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the following grammar, where a ∈ AP for some set AP of atomic propositions and pi ∈ V for
an infinite supply V of path variables:
ϕ ::= api | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ∃pi. ϕ
A formula is closed if all occurrences of some path variable pi are in the scope of a path
quantifier ∃pi. A HyperCTL specification is a Boolean combination of closed HyperCTL
formulas each beginning with a quantifier (or its negation). A formula is in negation normal
form (NNF) if it only contains negations in front of labels and in front of quantifiers. Every
HyperCTL formula can be transformed into an equivalent formula in negation normal form,
if we introduce the additional operators ϕ1∧ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1∨¬ϕ2) and ϕ1Rϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1U ¬ϕ2).
We extend HyperCTL with universal path quantification ∀pi. ϕ ≡ ¬∃pi.¬ϕ as well as
with the usual temporal operators: true ≡ api ∨ ¬api, false ≡ ¬true, ϕ ≡ true U ϕ, ϕ ≡
¬¬ϕ, ϕ1Wϕ2 ≡ ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∨ϕ1. For convenience, we also introduce some abbreviations
for comparing paths. Given a set P ⊆ AP of atomic propositions, we abbreviate pi[0] =P
pi′[0] ≡ ∧a∈P api↔ api′ , and pi =P pi′ ≡ (pi[0] =P pi′[0]), and analogously for 6=, e.g.,
pi 6=P pi′ ≡ ¬(pi=P pi′). Finally, [ϕ]pi indicates that the atomic propositions in ϕ are indexed
with the path variable pi, and [ϕ]pi→pi′ is the formula obtained by replacing index pi by index
pi′ on all (free) atomic propositions in ϕ.
2.3 Semantics
Let K = (S, s0, δ,AP, L) be a Kripke structure and ϕ a HyperCTL formula over atomic
propositions AP′. We define Π |=K ϕ, the satisfaction relation of ϕ with respect to a set of
paths Π = 〈pi1, . . . , pim〉, as follows:
Π |=K apik whenever a ∈ pik[0]
Π |=K ¬ψ whenever Π 6|=K ψ
Π |=K ψ1 ∨ ψ2 whenever Π |=K ψ1 or Π |= ψ2
Π |=K ψ whenever Π[1,∞] |=K ψ
Π |=K ψ1 U ψ2 whenever ∃i ≥ 0. Π[i,∞] |=K ψ2 and ∀0 ≤ j < i. Π[j,∞] |=K ψ1
Π |=K ∃pi. ψ whenever ∃pi ∈ PathsAP
′
K,pin[0]. Π + pi |=K ψ ,
where Π + pi is short for 〈pi1, . . . , pin, pi〉. For the special case that the set of paths is empty,
Π = 〈〉, we set PathsK,pin[0] = PathsK,s0 . We say that a Kripke structure K satisfies a
HyperCTL formula ϕ, denoted asK |= ϕ, if 〈〉 |=K ϕ holds true. Themodel checking problem
for HyperCTL is to decide whether a given Kripke structure satisfies a given HyperCTL
formula.
2.4 Examples
HyperCTL has a broad range of applications. In this subsection, we review a few motivating
examples to illustrate the expressivity of HyperCTL. Due to space limitations we focus on
applications in security and only sketch a few examples of other areas, such as the Hamming
distance of messages in coding theory.
For simplicity, we consider a synchronous system model1 for the remainder of this section.
The system reads input variables I ⊆ AP and writes output variables O ⊆ AP at every step;
for simplicity we assume that all variables are binary. Since we are not interested in the
1 HyperCTL can also express meaningful properties for asynchronous systems.
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internal behavior of systems, we specify our properties only in terms of their input-output
behavior.
Security
Informally, most secrecy properties essentially require that secret inputs shall not influence
the observable behavior of a system. We assume that the inputs are partitioned into subsets
H and L, that indicate the secret and the public variables (often called high and low in the
literature), and that the observer may only observe the output variables O. Noninterference
attempts to captures this notion of secrecy, which can be written in HyperCTL, simply
requiring that the output may only depend on the public inputs:
∀pi.∀pi′. (pi[0]=O pi′[0]) W (pi[0] 6=I pi′[0]).
This notion can be reinterpreted as a requirement of the system to produce the same output
for all paths up to a point in which a difference in the public input excuses differences
in the observable behavior. This reinterpretation enables the expression a basic form of
declassification by extending the “excuse”, using the following HyperCTL pattern:
∀pi.∀pi′. (pi[0]=O pi′[0]) W (pi[0] 6=I pi′[0] ∨ ϕ),
where ϕ would be instantiated by a simple LTL formula (for example on pi) requiring that
the user is logged in. This pattern can express for example that the user may only see data
if he is logged in, and if he is logged out, he may not receive any further updates. For a
more formal discussion of security definitions we refer to Section 5.
Coding Theory
Following the seminal work of Shannon, many encoding schemes have been designed to
provide error-resistant transmission of data. However, the formal verification of functional
correctness of implementations has received little attention so far. HyperCTL can easily
express important functional correctness criteria for encoders and decoders.
We first define the fundamental notion of Hamming distance. The Hamming distance is
the number of positions of two sequences of the same length that differ. The formula HamP
expresses that two sequences of states have a Hamming distance of at most d, considering
only differences in the propositions P ⊆ AP:
HamP (0, pi, pi′) = pi=P pi′ ,
HamP (d, pi, pi′) = pi[0]=P pi′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=P pi′[0] ∧ (HamP (d−1, pi, pi′))
)
The Hamming distance is often used as a metric for the error resistance of a code. If all
paths of a code have a minimal Hamming distance of d, the decoder can retrieve the original
word even if up to bd−12 c errors happened.
For the scenario in which the encoder transforms an input stream, represented by propo-
sitions I into codewords that are represented by propositions C, we can specify that an
encoder produces only code words that have minimal Hamming distance d:
∀pi.∀pi′. pi 6=I pi′ → ¬HamC(d− 1, pi, pi′) .
Similarly, we could formulate a correctness condition for decoders. For every code word, and
every message that differs from that code word in less than bd−12 c positions, the decoder
must produce the same decoded message. Note that these formulations are completely
independent of parameters like the block length and thus can be applied to compare different
kinds of coding schemes.
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Edit distance
Similarly to the Hamming distance, we can define other metrics based on the insertion or
deletion of elements. The following formula fragment requires that paths pi and pi′ differ
only in that pi′ has an additional position:
pi[0]=P pi′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=Ppi′[0]
)
.
We use this observation in Section 5 to encode security properties for non-synchronous
systems.
3 Related logics
3.1 Linear- and Branching-Time Temporal Logics
HyperCTL is an extension of CTL*, and therefore subsumes the usual temporal logics LTL,
CTL, and CTL* [13,22].
I Theorem 1. HyperCTL subsumes LTL, CTL, and CTL*.
A more interesting case is quantified propositional temporal logic (QPTL) [31]. QPTL
also extends LTL with quantification, but HyperCTL quantifies over paths and QPTL over
propositions. In terms of expressiveness, we prove now that HyperCTL strictly subsumes
QPTL. Informally, quantification over paths is more powerful than quantification over propo-
sitions, because the set of paths depends on the Kripke structure, while the truth values of
the quantified propositions do not. We will also exploit in Section 4 the relation between
HyperCTL and QPTL to obtain a model checking algorithm for HyperCTL. QPTL formulas
are generated by the following grammar, where p ∈ AP:
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ψ | ψ | ∃p. ψ ,
QPTL formulas are interpreted over paths with all operators inheriting the LTL semantics
except ∃pi.ψ:
pi |= ∃p. ψ whenever ∃pi′ ∈ (2AP)ω. pi =AP\p pi′ ∧ pi′ |= ψ .
A Kripke structure satisfies a QPTL formula if all paths from the initial state satisfy the
formula.
I Theorem 2. HyperCTL subsumes QPTL.
Proof. (sketch) In order to express a QPTL formula in HyperCTL, we rename all bound
propositions with unique fresh names AP′. We use these propositions as free variables,
which are unconstrained because they do not occur in the Kripke structure. Then, each
propositional quantification ∃p in the QPTL formula is replaced by a path quantification
∃pip in the HyperCTL formula, and each occurrence of p is replaced by ppip . J
I Theorem 3. QPTL does not subsume HyperCTL.
Proof. (sketch) Since QPTL formulas express path properties, which are checked on all
paths, QPTL cannot express properties that express the existence of paths such as ∃pi.ppi.
J
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EQCTL* and QCTL*
The logic EQCTL* [21,22] extends CTL* by the existential quantification over propositions.
QCTL* [15] additionally allows for negated existential (i.e. universal) quantifiers. However,
in contrast with our work, EQCTL* and QCTL* do not unify the quantification over paths
and the quantification over propositions. Similar to the result on satisfiability of HyperCTL,
the satisfiability of QCTL* is highly undecidable, which is shown using a different proof
technique. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no model checking algorithm has been
proposed for QCTL*. It is straightforward to derive one from the work in this paper. A
restricted version of QCTL*, building on CTL instead of CTL*, allows for a comparably
low worst-case complexity of the model checking problem [26]. It is open whether this result
can be transferred to HyperCTL.
3.2 Epistemic Logics
Epistemic logics [14] reason about the knowledge of agents and have gained increasing popu-
larity as specification languages for security over the past years [3,8,35]. Since the semantics
of epistemic logics relates multiple possible worlds (paths in the setting of temporal prop-
erties), these logics define hyperproperties. We now study the relation between epistemic
logics and HyperCTL.
Epistemic temporal logic with perfect recall semantics [3, 14, 34] extends LTL with the
knowledge operator Kiψ, which specifies that an observer i may know ψ. This logic is
defined on interpreted systems. An interpreted system I = (R,L,Q,AP) for m agents (or
processors) consists of a set of possible observations Q, a set of runs R ⊆ (Qm)ω, and a
labeling function L : R × N → 2AP. In general, each agent can only observe changes to its
current observation. Let r|n be the prefix of a run, up to and including step n, and let r|n,i
be the prefix of a run projected to the states of an agent i. The knowledge of an agent then
corresponds to trace(r|n,i), which is defined for n = 1 as trace(qi) = qi, and otherwise as
trace(r|n−2,i.qi.q′i) = trace(r|n−2,i.qi) if qi = q′i and trace(r|n−2.qi.q′i) = trace(r|n−2,i.qi).q′i if
qi 6= q′i.
Under the synchronous time assumption [14], agents may observe the occurrence of every
step. We capture this assumption by requiring that the observations of all agents include the
clock, e.g. Q = Q′ × N, and let the runs provide every agent with the correct step number.
We then have that trace(r|n,i) = r|n,i.
For a given run r ∈ R and a step number n, the satisfaction relation for the knowledge
operator is defined as follows:
r, n |= Kiψ whenever ∀r′ ∈ R. trace(r|n,i)= trace(r′|n,i) → r′, n |= ψ
An interpreted system I = (R,L,Q,AP) induces a unique Kripke structure K(I) =
(S, s0, δ,AP′, L′) with S = Qm × N ∪ {s0}, where s0 is a fresh initial state, and the runs R
define the transition relation δ. For the initial state s0, δ(s0) leads to the all initial states of
the interpreted system, which are defined by all prefixes of length 1 of some run in R. The
new set of propositions AP′ = AP × Qm includes local observations for all agents, to later
encode their knowledge in HyperCTL. The resulting labeling function is unique.
Note that for finite interpreted systems, that is if Q and AP are finite, L is only dependent
on the current states and the runs R are generated by a relation on Qm. Hence, the resulting
Kripke structure is finite as well.
Similarly, we can define the semantics of the knowledge operator on Kripke structures.
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We have that pi, i |= KPϕ iff
∀pi′ ∈ PathsK . trace(pi[0, i], P )=P trace(pi′[0, i], P ) → pi′, i |= ϕ ,
where trace(pi, P ) (the type being trace : S∗ × 2AP → S∗) is the projection to the points
in pi where propositions in P change. For example, trace(s1.s2.s3.s4.s4) = s1.s3, assuming
L(s1) = {a}, L(s2) = {a, c}, L(s3) = {a, b, c}, L(s4) = {a, b}, and P = {a, b}.
The following theorem shows that, under the synchronous time assumption, HyperCTL
subsumes epistemic temporal logic.
I Theorem 4. For every epistemic temporal logic formula ψ with synchronous time as-
sumption and interpreted system I, there is a HyperCTL formula ϕ such that I |= ψ iff
K(I) |= ϕ.
Proof. We start by considering extension HyperCTL with the knowledge operator with
the semantics above, and prepend a universal path quantifier. Then we apply a step-wise
transformation to eliminate all knowledge operators.
Let ϕ be a HyperCTL formula in NNF and in prenex normal form (note that epistemic
logic formulas prepended with a universal path quantifier are in prenex normal form). For
brevity we summarize the leading quantifiers of ϕ with Q, such that ϕ = Q.ϕ′ where ϕ′ is
quantifier free. Let t and u be propositions that ϕ does not refer to.
For the case that a knowledge operator KPψ occurs with positive polarity, we translate
ϕ into the following HyperCTL formula:
Q.∃pi. ϕ′|KPψ→upi ∧
(∀pi′. (tpi′ U¬tpi′) →
∀pi′′. (tpi′ → (pin[0]=P pi′′[0])) → (tpi′ ∧ upi → [ψ]pi′′)
)
,
and, if the knowledge operator occurs negatively,
Q.∃pi. ϕ′|¬KPψ→upi ∧
(∀pi′. (tpi′ U¬tpi′)→
∃pi′′. (tpi′ → (pin[0]=P pi′′[0])) ∧ (tpi′∧ upi ∧ ¬[ψ]pi′′)
)
,
where ϕ′|KPψ→upi denotes that in ϕ′ one positive or one negative occurrence, respectively, of
the knowledge operator KPψ gets replaced by proposition u. We repeat this transformation
until no knowledge operators remain, using the fact that every HyperCTL formula can be
transformed into prenex normal form.
The intuition of this transformation is to label the path (more precisely the tuple of paths
Π that is determined by the quantifiers Q) with binary signals t and u that indicate when
to check that φ has to hold on all (or some) alternative paths. By replacing the knowledge
operator by the existentially quantified proposition u, we select a satisfying interpretation (if
there is any) among the disjunctions concerning the application of the knowledge operator.
Hence, proposition upi at position i indicates whether to check that all paths that are equal
to pin up to position i must satisfy Π, i |=K ψ. We express that by universally selecting a
position, indicated by the point at which tpi′ switches from true to false (up to that point
the paths must be equal) and then requiring that when we reach that position and the flag
upi is set, we also have to check ψ on path ϕ.
The negated case follows the same intuition on the signals u and t, except that the same
(universal) quantifier cannot be reused to select the alternative path and the signal t. J
Without the synchronous time assumption, epistemic temporal logic is still subsumed by
HyperCTL, if we add stutter steps to the modified Kripke structure; let K ′(I) denote the
adapted Kripke structure. We give details on the modified transformation and the encoding
of the formula in Appendix A.
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I Theorem 5. For every epistemic temporal logic formula ψ and interpreted system I, there
is a HyperCTL formula ϕ such that I |= ψ iff K ′(I) |= ϕ.
3.3 SecLTL
SecLTL [12] extends temporal logic with the hide modality H , which allows us to express
information flow properties such as noninterference [16]. The semantics of SecLTL is defined
in terms of labeled transition system, where the edges are labeled with evaluations of the
set of variables. The formula HH,Oϕ specifies that the current evaluations of a subset H
of the input variables I are kept secret from an attacker who may observe variables in O
until the release condition ϕ becomes true. The semantics is formalized in terms of a set of
alternative paths to which the main path is compared:
AltPaths(pi,H) = {pi′ ∈ PathsK,pi[0] | pi[1]=I\H pi′[1] ∧ pi[2,∞]=I pi′[2,∞]}
A path pi satisfies the SecLTL formula HH,Oϕ, denoted by pi |= HH,Oϕ, iff
∀pi′ ∈ AltPaths(pi,H). (pi=O pi′ ∨ ∃i ≥ 0. (pi[i,∞] |=K ϕ) ∧ pi[1, i−1]=O pi′[1, i−1]) .
A transition system M satisfies a SecLTL formula ψ, denoted by M |= ψ, if every path pi
starting in the initial state satisfies ψ. To encode the hide modality in HyperCTL, we first
translate M into a Kripke structure K(M) whose states are labeled with the evaluation of
the variables on the edge leading into the state. The initial state is labeled with the empty
set. In the modified system, L(pi[1]) corresponds to the current labels. We encode HH,Oϕ
as the following HyperCTL formula:
∀pi′. pi[1]=I\H pi′[1] ∧
(
pi[1]=O pi′[1]W (pi[1] 6=I pi′[1] ∨ ϕ)
)
I Theorem 6. For every SecLTL formula ψ and transition system M , there is a HyperCTL
formula ϕ such that M |= ψ iff K(M) |= ϕ.
The model checking problem for SecLTL is PSPACE-hard in the size of the Kripke
structure [12]. The encoding of SecLTL specifications in HyperCTL implies that the model
checking problem for HyperCTL is also PSPACE-hard (for a fixed specification of alternation
depth ≥ 2), as claimed in Theorem 9.
4 Model Checking and Satisfiability
4.1 Model Checking
In this section we exploit the connection between HyperCTL and QPTL to obtain a model
checking algorithm for HyperCTL. We reduce the model checking problem for HyperCTL
to the satisfiability problem for QPTL. First, we encode the Kripke structure as a QPTL
formula. Then we qualify all quantifiers to refer to the interpretations of the propositions
that occur on the corresponding path in the Kripke structure. The satisfiability problem for
the resulting QPTL formula is nonelementary in the quantifier alternation depth.
I Definition 7 (Alternation Depth). A HyperCTL or QPTL formula ϕ in NNF has alter-
nation depth 1 plus the highest number of alternations from existential to universal and
universal to existential quantifiers along any of the paths of the formula’s syntax tree. Oc-
currences of U and R count as an additional alternation.
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I Theorem 8. The model checking problem for HyperCTL specifications ϕ with alternation
depth k is complete for NSPACE(g(k − 1, |ϕ|)).
Proof. The satisfiability problem for QPTL formulas ϕ in prenex normal form and with
alternation depth k is complete for NSPACE(g(k − 1, |ϕ|)) [31].
For the upper bound on the HyperCTL model checking complexity, we encode Kripke
structures as QPTL formulas (see e.g. [19, 23]) and translate until operators ψ U ψ′ as
∃t. t ∧ (t → ψ′ ∨ (ψ ∧t)) ∧ ¬ t .
HyperCTL path quantifiers are encoded by extending the set of atomic propositions, intro-
ducing for each quantifier an additional copy of AP. That is, assuming that all paths have
a unique name, we translate ∃pik. ψ to ∃APk.[ψ]pik→APk , where [ψ]pik→APk means that we let
the atomic propositions apik in ψ refer to the proposition a in the k-th copy of AP.
For the lower bound, we reduce the satisfiability problem for a given QPTL formula ϕ
in prenex normal form to a model checking problem K |= ϕ′ for some Kripke structure K
and some HyperCTL formula ϕ′. We assume, without loss of generality, that ϕ is closed (if
a free proposition occurs in ϕ, we bind it with an existential quantifier) and each quantifier
in ϕ introduces a different proposition.
The Kripke structure K = (S, s0, δ,AP, L) consists of two states S = {s0, s1}, is fully
connected δ : s 7→ S for s ∈ S, and is labeled with the truth values of a single atomic
proposition AP = {p}, L : s0 7→ ∅, s1 7→ {p}.
The QPTL quantifiers choose a valuation of the quantified propositions already in the
first position of a sequence while the path quantifiers of HyperCTL can only pick a new
state in the next position. Hence, we shift all atomic propositions in ϕ by one position, by
replacing every atomic proposition q in ϕ by q, resulting in the new QPTL formula ψ.
The final HyperCTL formula ϕ′ = T1(ψ) is constructed recursively from ψ as follows:
Tm(ψ) =

∃pim. Tm+1(ψ′[t 7→ ppim ]) if ψ = ∃t.ψ′
¬∃pim. Tm+1(ψ′[t 7→ ppim ]) if ψ = ¬∃t.ψ′
ψ otherwise
J
An NLOGSPACE lower bound in the size of the Kripke structure for fixed specifica-
tions with alternation depth 1 follows from the non-emptiness problem of non-deterministic
Büchi automata. For alternation depth 2 and more we can derive PSPACE hardness in
the size of the Kripke structure from the encoding of the logic SecLTL into HyperCTL (see
Subsection 3.3).
I Theorem 9. For HyperCTL formulas the model checking problem is hard for PSPACE in
the size of the system.
A Remark on Efficiency
The use of the standard encoding of the until operator in QPTL with an additional quantifier
is, in certain cases, wasteful. The satisfiability of QPTL formulas can be checked with an
automata-theoretic construction, where we first transform the formula into prenex normal
form, then generate a nondeterministic Büchi automaton for the quantifier-free part of the
formula, and finally apply projection and complementation to handle the existential and
universal quantifiers. In this way, each quantifier alternation, including the alternation
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introduced by the encoding of the until operators, causes an exponential blow-up. However,
if an until operator occurs in the quantifier-free part, the standard transformation of LTL
formulas to nondeterministic Büchi automata could handle this operator without quantifier
elimination, which would result in an exponential speedup.
Using this insight, the model checking complexity for many of the formulas presented
above and in Section 5 could be reduced by one exponent. Additionally, the complexity
with respect to the size of the system would reduce to NLOGSPACE for HyperCTL formulas
where the leading quantifiers are all of the same type and are followed by some quantifier-free
formula which may contain until operators without restriction.
4.2 Satisfiability
Unfortunately, the positive results regarding the decidability of the model checking problem
for HyperCTL do not carry over to the satisfiability problem. The finite-state satisfiability
problem consists of the existence of a finite model, while the general satisfiability problem
asks for the existence of a possibly infinite model. The following theorem shows that both
versions are undecidable.
I Theorem 10. For HyperCTL, finite-state satisfiability is hard for Σ01 and general satisfi-
ability is hard for Σ11.
Proof. We give a reduction from the synthesis problem for LTL specifications in a distributed
architecture consisting of two processes with disjoint sets of variables. The synthesis problem
consists on deciding whether there exist transition systems for the two processes with input
variables I1 and I2, respectively, and output variables O1 and O2, respectively, such that
the synchronous product of the two transition systems satisfies a given LTL formula ϕ. This
problem is hard for Σ01 if the transition systems are required to be finite, and hard for Σ11 if
infinite transition systems are allowed (Theorems 5.1.8 and 5.1.11 in [28]).
To reduce the synthesis problem to HyperCTL satisfiability, we construct a HyperCTL
formula ψ as a conjunction ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ ψ3. The first conjunct ensures that ϕ holds on
all paths: ψ1 = ∀pi.[ϕ]pi. The second conjunct ensures that every state of the model has a
successor for every possible input: ∀pi.∧I⊆I1∪I2 ∃pi′∧i∈I i ∧i6∈I ¬i. The third conjunct
ensures that the output in O1 does not depend on I2 and the output in O2 does not depend
on I1: ψ3 = ∀pi.∀pi′.
(
pi=I1 pi′ → pi=O1 pi′
) ∧ (pi=I2 pi′ → pi=O2 pi′).
The distributed synthesis problem has a (finite) solution iff the HyperCTL formula ψ
has a (finite) model. J
5 Applications in Security
Information flow is a much studied field in security [1–5, 11, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 30, 33, 38, 40].
The question of interest is whether a system reveals information about a cryptographic
key or personal data, generally called the secret, to an observer or attacker. This problem
goes beyond classical data flow analysis, in the sense that not only forbids the system from
revealing the secret as one of its outputs, but it also requires that the system’s observable
behavior is independent from the secret.
For example, consider the case of a hash set that stores both public and secret elements.
If an attacker observes the list of public elements in the set he may learn partial information
about the presence of secret elements and their values by observing the ordering of the low
elements. Even though in this case a security attack is not immediate and it might only work
under additional assumptions, secrets in the data structure may be compromised. Practical
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attacks based on such partial information have been implemented. For example, the well
known attack on SSL [7] uses subtle timing differences in the answers from a server.
The notion of noninterference by Goguen and Meseguer is the starting point of most of
the bast body of work on information flow. This notion states the secrecy requirement in
terms of two groups of users, which represent the secret (their behavior must be secret) and
the attacker, respectively. The group of attackers may not observe a different behavior of
the system, independent of whether the secret users perform actions or not.
I Theorem 11. There is a HyperCTL formula ϕNI (GH , GL) and an encoding K(M) of
state machines into Kripke structures such that for every state machine M , and groups of
users GH and GL, GH does not interfere with GL in M iff K(M) |= ϕNI (GH , GL) holds.
The encoding of state machines into Kripke structures and the proof are straightforward
and can be found in Appendix B.
A multitude of variations of the notion of secrecy have been proposed [1, 2, 4, 20, 24, 25,
30,40]. Even though hyperproperties [11] provide a useful semantical framework to capture
a broad range of these information flow properties, [11] does not provide any algorithmic
approaches. The technique of self-composition [5] can be used to cast the verification of
these information flow properties in terms of safety (and sometimes in terms of liveness)
problems [33,38] by modifying the system. However, these encodings can be rather involved
(cf. [17]) and hence, for many of the information flow variations, no algorithms exist yet
that allow for their precise verification.
In contrast, HyperCTL allows us to easily derive such algorithms for many of the pro-
posed notions of information flow without the need to modify the system. In the rest of
this section, we illustrate the expressiveness of HyperCTL by showing how to define non-
interference and also more modern definitions of security2. From the results of Section 4.1 it
follows that the formulas presented in this section yield efficient model checking algorithms,
particularly considering the remark on efficiency. These examples suggest that our common
logical framework of HyperCTL may also lead to advances for the practical verification of
security policies.
5.1 Security Definitions for Nondeterministic Systems
A common concern of many pieces of work following the seminal work of Goguen and
Meseguer is the extension of noninterference to nondeterministic systems (e.g. [24,25,39,40]).
Different approaches differ in their assumptions on the source of nondeterminism and discuss
what requirements would make a nondeterministic system intuitively secure.
Observational determinism [25, 40] is a conservative approach to nondeterminism that
assumes that the attacker does no only know the model, but can choose an arbitrary im-
plementation (refinement) thereof. Essentially, the property requires that for a given input
all possible executions of the system look identical for an observer independently of the
choice of the secret and of how the nondeterminism is resolved. Huisman et al. [17] en-
coded this information flow property as a CTL* formula after transforming the system via
self-composition [5]. HyperCTL can naturally express properties over multiple paths and
thus the property can be expressed without the need for modifications to the system. See
Appendix C for details.
2 The purpose of this section is not to argue for or against particular information flow policies.
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I Theorem 12. There is an encoding of programs as defined in [17] into Kripke structures,
such that HyperCTL can express observational determinism.
The proof shows that self-composition can be replaced by quantifying over two paths.
5.2 Security Lattices
It is common in security to allow for multiple hierarchically ordered security levels that
are (statically) assigned to users and/or data. HyperCTL can express these concerns by a
conjunction of multiple secrecy statements that separate the security levels. The formulation
of security lattices is independent of the precise notion of secrecy chosen.
5.3 Declassification
Many security critical systems reveal secret information partially or under certain conditions
as their normal mode of operation. For example, a piece of software that checks passwords
must reveal whether the entered password is correct or not. Noninterference, though, cat-
egorically rules out such behavior because it leaks some information to an attacker. Thus,
weaker notions of security have been proposed [2, 4, 12, 29] (see [30] for more literature).
There is a variety of patterns to integrate exception into information flow policies, which
are referred to as the dimensions of declassification [30].
The example of the password checking could be generalized to the pattern (or dimension)
that a predefined fact about the secret may be released, e.g. [29]. Other patterns are that
after a certain condition has been fulfilled information may be released (for example, after
access has been granted) [6, 12], or that some input must be considered secret only under
certain conditions (for example, the keyboard input is only secret while the cursor is in a
password field) [12].
I Theorem 13. HyperCTL subsumes the declassification properties encoded in [3].
The result follows from the encoding [3] of declassification properties into epistemic
temporal logic [14] and the fact that HyperCTL subsumes epistemic temporal logic (see
Section 3). Appendix D contains a discussion of the example of a password checker above
to show that declassification properties can indeed be expressed elegantly in HyperCTL.
5.4 Quantitative Information Flow
In cases where leaks cannot be prevented absolutely, we might want to limit the quantity
of the lost information [9, 18, 20, 32, 37]. First of all, this quantification requires to measure
information by some definition of entropy. It turns out that for different practical scenarios
different notions of this measure are appropriate. To define meaningful measures of entropy
of a secret, secrets are generally assumed to be chosen randomly and independently and
the system under consideration is assumed to be deterministic (not nondeterministic, that
is). The essence of quantitative information flow, though, can be formulated in a uniform
way for all measures of entropy. All we have to assume is a fixed measure of entropy H(X)
for a random variable X and a notion of conditional entropy H(X|Y = y) indicating the
entropy of X under the assumption that the result of a second (possibly correlated) random
experiment Y is known to be y.
Leaks can then be measured in terms of lost entropy, that is, the difference between the
initial entropy of the secret H, and the remaining entropy when observing the output O:
H(H) − H(H|O). Formally the bounding problem of quantitative information flow is then
defined as to determine whether this difference is bounded by a given constant [32,37].
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Min Entropy
The min entropy measure concerns the highest probability that an attacker correctly guesses
the secret in a single try and it is considered to be one of the most appropriate indications
of how useful the observations are for the attacker [32]. The min entropy of a random
variable H is defined as − log maxh p(H = h), where p indicates the probability measure.
The conditional min entropy is defined as − log∑o p(O = o)(maxh p(H = h|O = o)), which,
by Bayes’ theorem, becomes − log∑o maxh p(O = o|H = h)p(H = h).
Under the assumption that the system under consideration is deterministic p(O = o|H =
h) is either 0 or 1 and further p(H = h) is a constant cH if we assume the secret to be
uniformly distributed. The bounding problem of quantitative noninterference for the min
entropy measure and for a given bound n hence simplifies to the following question:
n ≥ − log cH + log
(
cH
∑
o, ∃h.p(O=o|H=h)=1 1
)
,
and amounts to specifying that there is no tuple of 2n+1 distinguishable paths. (see [32] for
more detailed discussions.) In a synchronous system setting (cf. Section 2.4), where I ⊆ AP
and O ⊆ AP refer to the atomic propositions indicating the input and output, respectively,
we can, thus formulate this condition as follows:
ϕQIF = ¬∃pi0. . . . . ∃pi2n .
(∧
i
pii =I pi0
)
∧
∧
i 6=j
pii 6=O pij
Yasuoka and Terauchi proved that 2n+1 is the optimal number of paths to formulate this
property [37].
6 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have introduced the temporal logic HyperCTL, which extends CTL* with path vari-
ables. HyperCTL provides a uniform logical framework for temporal hyperproperties. The
quantification over paths in HyperCTL subsumes related extensions of temporal logic such
as the hide operator of SecLTL and the knowledge operator of temporal epistemic logic.
Beyond the properties expressible in these temporal logics, HyperCTL expresses a rich set
of properties from security and coding theory, such as noninterference and the preservation
of entropy. The encoding of these properties in HyperCTL is natural and efficient: for many
security properties the complexity of the HyperCTL model checking algorithm matches the
lower bounds known for the individual properties. HyperCTL thus not only provides a
common semantic foundation for properties from a diverse class of applications but also a
uniform algorithmic solution.
An important open question concerns the identification of efficient fragments of Hyper-
CTL, motivated in particular by the significant gap between the PSPACE-complete model
checking problem for CTL* and the non-elementary model checking problem of general
HyperCTL formulas.
From a semantic perspective, it is worth noting that the expressiveness of HyperCTL
exceeds the original definition of hyperproperties [11]. While Clarkson and Schneider’s
hyperproperties are sets of sets of sequences, and thus have their semantic foundation in
the linear-time paradigm of sequences, HyperCTL integrates, like CTL*, the linear-time
view with the branching-time view. When path quantifiers occur in the scope of temporal
operators, the HyperCTL formula expresses that the new paths branch off in the same state
of the Kripke structure. A full investigation of the linear vs branching time spectrum of
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hyperproperties and the implications on the complexity, compositionality, and usability of
logics for hyperproperties are intriguing challenges for future research.
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A Epistemic Logics Without the Synchronous Time Assumption
We now discuss the adaptations necessary to extend the encoding from the proof of Theo-
rem 4 to non-synchronous systems. The following proof of Theorem 5 is also a good example
for the general treatment of asynchronous executions in HyperCTL.
I Theorem 5. For every epistemic temporal logic formula ψ and interpreted system I, there
is a HyperCTL formula ϕ such that I |= ψ iff K ′(I) |= ϕ.
Proof. First, we define the model transformation K ′(I), which differs from K(I) in that
it adds stuttering steps. In the resulting Kripke structure, we indicate for each transition
whether it is due to a step of the interpreted system or if it is a newly added stuttering step.
For a given interpreted system I, the stuttering Kripke structureK ′(I) = (S, s0, δ,AP, L)
is defined via the non-stuttering Kripke structure K(I) = (S′, s′0, δ′,AP′, L′), where S =
S′ × {stutter,move}, s0 = (s0, stutter), δ(〈s, x〉) = δ′(s) × {move} ∪ {〈s, stutter〉}, AP =
AP ∪ {stutter,move}, and L(〈s, x〉) = L′(s) ∪ {x}.
In K ′(I), the path quantifiers range over a larger set of paths that we have to restrict
to those that do not stutter forever (progress(pi) = movepi) and to those pairs of paths
that synchronize correctly. The correct synchronization of two paths pi and pi′ means that
the observations regarding some set of propositions P changes in one path iff it changes also
in the other path: synch(pi, pi′) = 
(
pi[0] 6=P pi[0] ⇔ pi′[0] 6=P pi′[0]
)
.
The encoding from the proof of Theorem 4 is now modified as follows for positively
occurring knowledge operators:
Q.∃pi. ϕ′|KPψ→upi ∧
(∀pi′. (tpi′ U¬tpi′) → ∀pi′′. progress(pi′′) ∧ synch(pi, pi′′) ∧
(tpi′ → (pin[0]=P pi′′[0])) → (tpi′ ∧ upi → [ψ]pi′′)
)
,
and, for negatively occurring knowledge operators:
Q.∃pi. ϕ′|KPψ→upi ∧
(∀pi′. (tpi′ U¬tpi′)→ ∃pi′′. progress(pi′′) ∧ synch(pi, pi′′) ∧
(tpi′ → (pin[0]=P pi′′[0])) ∧ (tpi′∧ upi ∧ ¬[ψ]pi′′)
)
,
For a positively occurring knowledge operator KPψ, we prove that given two executions
pi1 and pi2, if the sub-formula ψ must hold on pi2 at some position i (by the semantics of the
knowledge operator), then the formula above requires that on a stuttered version of pi1 the
sub-formula is applied at state pi2[i]. We consider the prefixes of the two executions, pi1[0, i]
and pi2[0, j] and assume they have the same traces with respect to P ⊆ AP. For these, there
are two stuttered versions pi and pi′′ (named to match the path variables in the formula
above) that synchronize the positions at which they change their observations with respect
to P and pad the prefixes to the same length k (without changing their final states, that is
pi2[i] = pi′′[k]). There is also a labeling with tpi′ that ensures that the knowledge operator is
evaluated until position k. Hence, ψ is applied on pi′′ at state pi2[i].
The other direction is straightforward, and the case of a negatively occurring knowledge
operator follows similarly. J
B Goguen and Meseguer’s Noninterference
B.1 Noninterference
A point of reference for most of the literature on information flow is the definition of non-
interference that was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer in 1982 [16]. In this subsection,
we show how to express noninterference in a simple HyperCTL formula.
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The system model used in [16], which we will refer to as deterministic state machines,
operates on commands c ∈ C that are issued by different users u ∈ U . The evolution of a
deterministic state machine is governed by the transition function do : S × U × C → S and
there is a separate observation function out : S×U → Out that for each user indicates what
he can observe.
We define standard notions on sequences of users and events. For w ∈ (U × C)∗ and
G ⊆ U let |w|G denote the projection of w to the commands issued by the users inG. Further,
we extend the transition function do to sequences, do(s, (u, c).w) = do(do(s, u, c), w), where
the dot indicates concatenation. Finally, we extend the observation function out to sequences
w, indicating the observation after w: out(w,G) = out(do(s0, w), G). Noninterference is
then defined as a property on systems M . A set of users GH ⊆ U does not interfere with a
second group of users GL ⊆ U , if:
∀w ∈ (U × C)∗. out(w,GL) = out(|w|GH , GL) .
That is, we ask whether the same output would be produced by the system, if all actions
issued by any user in GH were removed.
B.2 Encoding GM’s System Model
First, we need to map their system model into Kripke structures as used for the formulation
of HyperCTL (which, obviously, must not solve problem by itself). We choose an intuitive
encoding of state machines in Kripke structures that indicates in every state (via atomic
propositions) which observations can be made for the different users, and also which action
was issued last, including the responsible user.
We choose a simple translation that maps a state machine M = (S,U,C,Out, out, do, s0)
to the Kripke structure K = (S′, s′0, δ,AP, L), where S′ = {s0} ∪ S × U × C, s′0 = s0, AP =
U ×C ∪ U ×Out, and the labeling function is defined as L(s0) = {(u, out(s0, u)) | u ∈ U}
for the initial state and L((s, u, c)) = {(u, c)}∪ {(u′, out(s, u′)) | u′ ∈ U} for all other states.
The transition function is defined as
δ(s, u, c) = {(s′, u′, c′) | do(s, u′, c′) = s′, u′∈ U, c′∈ C}
Each state (except for the initial state) has labels indicating the command that was issued
last, and the user that issued the command. The remaining labels denote the observations
that the individual users can make in this state.
To access these two separate pieces of information, we introduce functions in : S → U×C,
which is not defined for s0, and out : S×U → Out (by abusing notation slightly), with their
obvious meanings.
In this system model let s =U\GH s′ mean that if we entered one of the states s and
s′ with a user not in GH the users and commands must be identical. If both states are
entered by users in GH then the commands may be different. The output equality on states
s =O,GL s′, shall refer to the observations the users GL can make at this state. Then,
noninterference can be expressed as follows:
ϕNI (GH , GL) = ∀pi.∀pi′. pi[0] =U\GH pi′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=U\GH pi′[0] ∧(
pi[0] ∈ H ∧ (pi[0] =U\GH pi′[0]) =⇒ (pi[0] =O,GL pi′[0])
))
,
I Theorem 14. There is a HyperCTL formula ϕNI (GH , GL) and an encoding K(M) of
state machines into Kripke structures such that for every state machine M , and groups of
users GH and GL it holds K(M) |= ϕNI (GH , GL) iff GH does not interfere with GL in M .
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Proof. The formula pattern pi[0] =U\GH pi′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=U\GH pi′[0] ∧ ϕ
)
implies that ϕ is
applied exactly at the first position at which pi and pi′ differ in their input (except, possibly,
on the input of users in GH). As, for a fixed path pi, we quantify over all paths pi′ the
subformula ϕ is hence applied to every position of every path pi.
The subformula ϕ then requires that, if from that position on pi’s input differs from the
input of pi′ only in that it has an additional (secret) action by some user in GH , both paths
must look equivalent from the view point of the users in GL. The interesting part here is
the use of the next operator, as it enables the comparison of different positions of the traces.
Thus, we compare path pi to all other paths that have one secret action less than itself.
Hence, by transitivity of equivalence, we compare all paths pi to a version of itself that is
stripped of all secret actions. J
C Observational Determinism
I Theorem 12. There is an encoding of programs as defined in [17] into Kripke structures,
such that HyperCTL can express observational determinism.
Proof. Huisman et al. [17] define observational determinism over programs in a simple while
language, which is very similar to the execution model of [40]. First, they define a special
version of self-composition on their programs that allows both sides to move independently
by introduces stuttering steps. Then, they encode programs into Kripke structures that do
not only maintain the current state, but also remember the last state. The CTL* formula
is then proved to precisely express observational determinism. Since HyperCTL subsumes
CTL*, we can make use of the same encoding of programs into Kripke structures, but we
leave out the self-composition operation on programs. In order to re-enable the correct
synchronization of paths, however, we have to introduce stutter steps for single, not self-
composed that is, programs.
We prepend the CTL* formula with two path quantifiers over paths pi1 and pi2 and we
let those propositions of the formula that referred to the two copies of the program now
refer to the two paths, respectively. J
D An Example of a Declassification Property
Although we have shown that declassification properties can be encoded in principle, the
two-step encoding via epistemic logics, will not necessarily lead to a practical verification
approach. Further, the encoding via epistemic logics [3] assumes a non-reactive system
model (it has no inputs) and thus its flavor of noninterference on which they build the other
encodings does not subsume Goguen and Meseguer’s definition. In this appendix we show
with the help of an example that declassification properties can be encoded in an elegant
way leading to efficient algorithmic approaches.
Let us continue to work in the setting of deterministic state machines as we used already
for noninterference [16]. We consider the case of a system that shall allow a user A to set a
secret password for her account names “Alice”, which a user B wants to access. In order to
get access to the account B would have to guess the password correctly, which we assume
impossible without additional knowledge. We would like to specify the external behavior of
the system in terms of the commands that allow to change passwords and access accounts.
We assume that passwords are stored as hash values of length 256.
Let C ⊇ {changePwd}×Accounts×B256 ∪ {login}×Accounts×B256 and U ⊇ {A,B},
where Accounts refers to the domain of account names. We assume that passwords can only
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be changed while logged in and that user A is signed in from the beginning. Further, let
i ∈ B256 be the initial password. Then the formulation of noninterference could be refined to
compare only those paths on which the current password was not guessed correctly. First,
we define the LTL property on individual paths that the initial password is not guessed until
it is replaced, and that the same holds for every password that is set during the run of the
system:
ψ =
∧
x∈B256(¬〈B, 〈login,Alice, i〉〉 U 〈A, 〈changePwd,Alice, x〉〉) ∧

(∧
x,y∈B256〈A, 〈changePwd,Alice, x〉〉 =⇒
¬〈B, 〈login,Alice, x〉〉 U 〈A, 〈changePwd,Alice, y〉〉) ,
and then embed ψ into ϕNI :
∀pi.∀pi′. [ψ]pi ∧ [ψ]pi′ =⇒ pi[0] =U\GH pi′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=U\GH pi′[0] ∧(
pi′[0] ∈ H ∧ (pi[0] =U\GH pi′[0]) =⇒ (pi[0] =O,GL pi′[0])
))
.
Adding the assumption that the password is not simply guessed correctly essentially did
not change the structure of the property. The advantage of the logical approach is that such
assumptions could also be added to other definitions of secrecy, like that of observational
determinism, without the need to reengineer the algorithm for their verification completely.
